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NOTES
LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES: A NEW INTEREST
BALANCING TEST FOR
INDIGENT CIVIL
LITIGANTS
The Supreme Court has struggled frequently with the question of what
process is due in a variety of noncriminal proceedings.' To resolve this
question, modem due process analysis requires a balancing of three interests: the individual litigant's personal interests; the need for procedural
safeguards; and the government's interest in economic efficiency and administrative convenience. 2 Indigent litigants pose special problems because their particular disadvantages may require the adoption of more
procedural protections, including the appointment of counsel.3 In criminal
1. Before addressing what quantum of process is due, courts must determine whether
constitutional due process guarantees are implicated. See Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 839 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) ("The
requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."). See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (termination of Social Security disability benefits);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from school); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (revocation of probation); and Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (prolonged or indefinite deprivation of parental custody). For a discussion of judicial
approaches to due process prior to Roth, see Note, Specfying the ProcedureRequiredby Due
Process: TowardLimits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1974). An
exhaustive examination of the law of due process is outside the scope of this Note. For a
more extensive discussion of due process, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
501-559 (1978).
2. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying
text.
3. Generally, courts have found that indigent litigants are less familiar with the judicial process and, consequently, more intimidated. As with all unrepresented civil defendants, indigent litigants are usually incapable of understanding the complexities of a modem
civil trial. In addition, the unrepresented litigant may have a limited education that is no
match for a seasoned attorney's legal expertise. See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counselin
Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967). For judicial commentary on the plight of indigent
litigants, see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 603; Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge,
396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1976). In a proceeding terminating parental rights,
the extreme emotional stress may also have a debilitating effect on an unrepresented indi-
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cases, an indigent has a right to counsel where actual imprisonment is imposed.4 Despite the general rule mandating the appointment of counsel in
criminal cases, "no fixed rule regarding the right to counsel has developed
in noncriminal proceedings."'
In termination of parental rights and prolonged deprivation of custody
cases,' however, the lower courts have consistently held that an indigent
parent has a right to the appointment of counsel.7 Recently, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of an indigent's right to appointment of counsel
in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County,8 a state-

initiated termination of parental rights proceeding. 9 The Court held that
parents do not have a per se right to state appointed counsel in a terminagent litigant. See id; Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 411,
320 A.2d 203, 208 (1974), modfed, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (1975).
4. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) ("actual imprisonment ... [is] the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel."). See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (regardless of the type of offense, appointment of counsel is required
where imprisonment is imposed). The analysis of an indigent criminal's right to appointment of counsel involves both the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the sixth
amendment. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370-74. The sixth amendment provides that the accused in a
criminal proceeding "shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VI. See also infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
5. L. TRIBE, supra note 1,at 553 (footnote omitted). "Instead, the Court has indicated
that the decision whether to appoint counsel in due process hearings should be made on a
case by case basis, and that counsel is constitutionally required only where such assistance
would be especially useful given the nature of the issues and the ability of the claimant to
express himself adequately." Id (footnote omitted). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Note, supra note 3, at 545-50.
6. The termination of parental rights is the most drastic remedy available in juvenile
court proceedings. See Note, The Right to Family Integrfty: A Substantive Due ProcessApproach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 230 (1978). In
North Carolina, for example, when a court enters an order terminating a parent's rights, the
order
completely and permanently terminates all rights and obligations of the parent to
the child and of the child to the parent, arising from the parental relationship ...
Such parent is not thereafter entitled to notice of proceedings to adopt the child
and may not object thereto or otherwise participate therein.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981).
The significance and finality of a termination order is best appreciated when compared to
the effect of a typical custody award. Generally, custody awards are temporary and can be
modified pursuant to an action by the non-custodial party showing a change of circumstances since the time of the award. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody Pt. 2 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 615, 623 (1964); Note, supra at 225-30.
7. See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 604; Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973).
8. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
9. Under North Carolina law, a petition to terminate parental rights can be filed by the
county department of social services or the licensed child-placing agency that has custody of
the child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24(3) (1981). The hearing is before a district court
sitting without a jury. Id § 7A-289.30(a).
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tion proceeding, thus rejecting the prevailing legal theory and eliminating
the consistency that had existed regarding an indigent parent's right to
counsel.' ° Instead, the Court endorsed a case-by-case approach, using a
four-pronged balancing test."
The plaintiff, Abby Gail Lassiter, originally lost custody of her infant
son, William, in 1975 for failing to provide him with adequate medical
care.' 2 The District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, gave custody to the Durham County Department of Social Services.1 3 In 1976, Ms.
Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to twentyfive to forty years in prison.4 Two years later, the Department of Social
Services filed a petition to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights. Ms.
Lassiter appeared at the hearing without counsel and unsuccessfully attempted to cross-examine the state's sole witness, a Department social
worker.'" The social worker testified that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted
her son since 1975, had failed to correct the circumstances that necessitated
the 1975 custody order, and had not demonstrated sufficient concern regarding her child's future. 16 The court found that Ms. Lassiter had shown
no interest in the child's future life, care, or welfare, and terminated her
parental rights.' 7 On appeal, Ms. Lassiter's sole contention was that her
indigent status entitled her to counsel under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected
this argument and upheld the district court's decision to terminate Ms.
Lassiter's parental rights.'" The United States Supreme Court affirmed in
a five to four decision written by Justice Stewart.' 9
10. See supra note 7 and infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In Lassiter, the Court said the balancing
test was to be applied by the trial court in each termination proceeding. 452 U.S. at 32.
12. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id at 21-23. The trial judge repeatedly attempted to explain the rules of crossexamination, but eventually disallowed many of Ms. Lassiter's statements as argumentative.
Id at 54 n.22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text
discussing Ms. Lassiter's difficulties.
16. Specifically, the Department alleged that Ms. Lassiter
ha[d] willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive years
without showing that substantial progress has been made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the child, or without showing a positive response
to the diligent efforts of the Department. . . to strengthen her relationship to the
child, or to make and follow through with constructive planning for the future of
the child.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21.
17. Id at 24.
18. In re William Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 527, 259 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1979).
19. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell, and
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In a novel analysis, the Court balanced the three due process considerations against a presumption that the right to appointment of counsel is
contingent on imprisonment.2" The Court merged civil and criminal due
process analyses, to conclude that Ms. Lassiter's interests were insufficient
to overcome the combined weight of the state's interests and the presumption that imprisonment is a prerequisite to appointment of counsel.2 Recognizing that in certain situations the parent's interests would outweigh the
22
combination of the state's interests and the imprisonment presumption
(for example, where the procedures were complex or the proceedings were
formal and adversarial), the Court left the decision to appoint counsel to
the trial judge on a case-by-case basis.2 3
This Note will analyze the Lassiter decision in light of the Court's melding of the criminal and civil due process analyses of the right to appointment of counsel. It will incorporate briefly the recent evolution of the right
to appointment of counsel in order to illustrate the significance of
Lassiter's new due process analysis. Concentrating on the particular difficulties encountered by Ms. Lassiter, this Note will illustrate the divergence
of the new analysis from the modem trend in appointment of counsel
cases. Finally, it will extrapolate the impact of the Lassiter analysis on
future indigent civil litigants who will encounter an unattainable barrier as
a precondition to appointment of counsel.

I.

THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: ACTUAL
IMPRISONMENT REQUIRED

Prior to 1942, the Supreme Court had recognized that the right to counsel was a significant safeguard. In Powell v. Alabama,2 4 the Court noted
that even an "intelligent and educated layman" would encounter considerable difficulties in presenting his own case. 5 Similarly, in holding that the
Rehnquist joined the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion joined
by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent.
20. Id at 31. The Court's method actually involved a two-step process. Initially, the
three civil due process considerations-the litigant's interests, the need for procedural safeguards, and the state's interest-were weighed and balanced. The result was then balanced
against the presumption that imprisonment is required to invoke a right to appointed counsel. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
21. 452 U.S. at 31-32.
22. Id at 31.
23. Id at 31-32. The Court relied on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), in deciding to leave the decision to appoint counsel to the trial judge. See infra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text.
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id at 69. The Court said:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
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sixth amendment requires the appointment of counsel in all federal criminal prosecutions,26 the Court characterized the right to counsel as "necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." 27 The Court,
however, was reluctant to provide a per se right to counsel. In Betts v.
to counsel to
Brady,,21 the Court specifically refused to extend the right
29
every state criminal case, regardless of the circumstances.
In holding that the failure to appoint counsel for Betts did not violate a
fundamental right, the Court focused on the "totality of facts" and found
that Betts' trial did not evidence special circumstances warranting appointment of counsel.3" That is, despite the lack of counsel, Betts' trial was
"fundamental[ly] fair." The Court endorsed a case-by-case approach, focusing on the particular difficulties or special circumstances encountered
by the unrepresented defendant. 3 '
The new standard was a less than ideal solution to the right to counsel
problem. The practical difficulties of utilizing a case-by-case, special circumstances approach were evidenced by a plethora of cases that were a
hend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
26. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27. Id.at 462. See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (the assistance of counsel is a fundamental safeguard); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44
(1936) ("fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution").
28. 316 U.S. 455 (1941). Betts had been indicted for robbery in the Circuit Court of
Carroll County, Md. He requested appointment of counsel due to his indigent status, but
the trial judge denied his request pursuant to the local practice of providing counsel only in
murder and rape cases. Betts proceeded to conduct his own defense, was found guilty, and
was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Id at 456-57.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id at 462. The Court said that the
[aisserted denial [of due process by denying appointment of counsel] is to be tested
by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one
setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense
of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall
short of such denial.
Id The majority distinguished Powell and Grosyean, on the ground that those cases did not
address specifically the question of whether due process requires the appointment of counsel
in every criminal case. Id at 462-63.
31. Id at 471-72.
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"continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal
courts."3 2 In addition, the Court itself began to carve out certain exceptions to the Betts case-by-case approach. The Court found a per se right to
counsel where the defendant was illiterate, mentally handicapped, or a minor, and where the statute or legal question involved was extremely complex.33 These cases elucidated the desire for a more rigid and consistent
standard for determining whether due process mandated the appointment
of counsel. Recognizing the possible inequities in the case-by-case
method, the Court adopted a nondiscretionary standard in the landmark
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.34
The petitioner, Clarence Gideon, was charged with breaking and entering, a noncapital felony, and appeared at his trial without counsel. 35 Despite his indigent status, Gideon's request for court appointed counsel was
refused by the trial judge because Florida law only required appointment
of counsel in capital cases. 36 Handicapped by his lack of legal experience,
Gideon presented his own defense, and was convicted and sentenced to
five years in prison.37 The Florida Supreme Court denied Gideon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus without issuing an opinion.3 8 Gideon then
32. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 338 (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155
(1957); Artrip v. State, 136 So. 2d 574 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962); Shaffer v. Warden, 211 Md. 635,
126 A.2d 573 (1956)).
33. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (illiteracy); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (complex state statute regarding use of prior convictions at
accused's trial for a similar crime); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (insanity); Uveges
v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) (minor). "The practical result was that Betts v.
Brady had been in gradual disuse since the day it was handed down." Comment, Right to
Counsel: The Impact of Gideon V. Wainwright in the Ffty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103,
104 (1970). See generally Kamisar, The Right to Counseland the FourteenthAmendment:. A
Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962); W.
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 160-91 (1955).
Thirty-seven states had also adopted procedures that provided counsel "for all indigent
felony defendants regardless of 'special circumstances.'" Kamisar, supra, at 17 n.76 (citing
McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 119-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The case was important because the Supreme Court finally
overruled Betts and created an unqualified right to counsel in felony prosecutions. Yet it
was not a startling decision, given the Court's decisions subsequent to Bets and the states'
appointment of counsel, by law or court practice, in most criminal cases. Israel, Gideon v.
Wainwright: The "'Art"of Overruling 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 211, 212. See also Kamisar, supra
note 33, at 17-20 (by 1962 only four states did not require appointment of counsel by law or
court practice).
35. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1962) (mem.). On remand from the United
States Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court said that it had relied on Betts in its
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appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme Court.3 9
The Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has an unqualified
right to appointed counsel in all felony prosecutions.4" Justice Black wrote
that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."4 1 The right to
counsel was a fundamental right necessary for proper and just adjudication.4 2 While Gideon established mandatory appointment of counsel in
felony cases, the lower courts remained split on the effect of Gideon in
prosecutions for lesser crimes and misdemeanors. 43 Some courts confined
Gideon to felony cases, since the Court had considered only the case of an
indigent felony defendant." Other courts "extend[ed] the right [to counsel] to every indigent accused of any offense, petty or serious,"4 5 finding
Gideon's broad language to encompass all criminal prosecutions. Two
subsequent Supreme Court cases clarified when appointment of counsel
was mandated.4 6
II.

ARGERSINGER AND SCOrT: CONSISTENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF

INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

In Argersinger v. Hamlin,4 Jon Argersinger was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon which made him subject to a maximum fine of five hundred dollars, a jail sentence up to six months, or both. 48 Argersinger appealed his conviction, alleging that his indigent status entitled him to state
appointed counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied Argersinger's petition for habeas corpus relief on the ground that his punishment did not
exceed six months in jail, the customary standard for appointment of counearlier dismissal of Gideon's habeas corpus petition. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299
(Fla. 1963). The court merely found that the circumstances surrounding Betts' trial did not
warrant the appointment of counsel. Id at 299.
39. 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
40. Betts was overruled to the extent it held that no fundamental right mandated appointment of counsel in all felony cases. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.

41. Id at 344.
42. Id.

43. See Comment, supra note 33, at 111-34. Prior to 1970, 19 states provided counsel in
most misdemeanor cases, 12 states provided counsel in cases involving "serious crimes", and
19 states provided counsel only for felony defendants. Id
44. Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel- Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L.

REV. 601, 602 (1975) (footnote omitted).
45. Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1966); see also
Comment, supra note 33, at 124; Duke, supra note 44, at 601-12.

46. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
47. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

48. Id at 26.
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sel.4 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the type of
crime or the length of imprisonment did not affect the critical role that a
lawyer commands in an adversary hearing.5" The Court refused, however,
to address the issue of right to counsel where a "loss of liberty is not involved," because Argersinger was actually sentenced to ninety days in
jail.5' Essentially, the Court extended an indigent's right to counsel to all
classes of crimes, regardless of their severity or insignificance, as long as
the indigent suffered a deprivation of liberty.5 2
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Argersinger principle in Scott v. Illinois." In Scott, the indigent petitioner had been sentenced to pay a fifty
dollar fine for shoplifting. Under the applicable Illinois statute, the maximum penalty for shoplifting was a $500 fine, one year in jail, or both. 54
The petitioner argued that Argersinger clearly extended the right to counsel to cases where imprisonment was authorized. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the petitioner's argument, and found that the
mere statutory authorization of imprisonment upon conviction did not involve a deprivation of liberty or property that was protected under the
fourteenth amendment.55 Justice Rehnquist stated the clear rule of

Argersinger to be that "no indigent criminal defendant [can] be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense." 5' 6 Accordingly, the Court
49. State ex rel Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970). The Florida
Supreme Court relied on the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida practice of appointing counsel only where imprisonment for the offense was greater than
six months. Id at 444.
50. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 30-34. The Court gave great weight to an American Civil Liberties Union study, which found that "[mlisdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are
defendants who face similar charges without counsel." Id at 36 (citing A.C.L.U., LEGAL
COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS,

PRELIMINARY REPORT 1

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT

(1970)). See L.

HERMAN, THE

18-20 (1973).

51. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26, 37.
52. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued that the appointment of counsel
should be made on a case-by-case basis. Id at 63-65 (Powell, J., concurring). He listed
three factors that should be analyzed in each case: the complexity of the offense charged, the
probable sentence if the defendant is convicted, and "individual factors peculiar to each
case." Id. at 64. The competency of the individual defendant and the attitude of the community toward the defendant were two "individual factors" delineated by Justice Powell.
He acknowledged, however, that the individual factors would be very difficult to ascertain.
Id
53. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
54. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969).
55. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
56. Id (emphasis supplied). The Court also reaffirmed Argersinger's holding that the
type of offense or length of imprisonment was irrelevant in determining if the right to counsel was mandated. Id at 373.
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held that the right to appointment of counsel was not mandated in Scott's
case because he was merely fined and not imprisoned.5 7
Although the question of what process is due an indigent criminal defendant has been firmly established in regard to appointment of counsel,
an indigent civil litigant does not enjoy the same procedural consistency.
In the past decade, the Court has slowly developed a balancing test to
determine what process is due in noncriminal litigation. A brief review of
this recent development will facilitate an analysis of Lassiter's new standard for indigent civil litigants.
III.

CIVIL LITIGANTS: AT THE MERCY OF A BALANCING TEST

The recent evolution of procedural due process reflects a determined effort by the Supreme Court to review noncriminal hearing procedures for
constitutional inadequacies.5 Initially, the Court ascertains whether the
individual's interest "is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
57. Id. at 374. The line of due process cases discussed above creates an anomaly. See
Duke, supra note 44, at 608-09. The author notes that some sixth amendment rights are
limited or defined, and others are not, yet the amendment states that in "all
criminal prosecutions" the delineated rights shall apply. Id. Each case discussed above clearly acknowledges the vital role of counsel in assuring a fair trial. See supra notes 24-34 and
accompanying text. See also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30-34. Despite the attorney's critical
role, the Court has refused to extend the same assurance of fairness to those indigents who
are not imprisoned. The rationale is that fines or adjudications of guilt do not necessarily
involve deprivation of personal liberty, and therefore the due process clause is not implicated. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. at 373; supra note 1.
Although the Scott decision is well accepted in present criminal procedure jurisprudence,
the restriction of the right to counsel to imprisoned indigents is far from a "fundamentally
fair" procedure. See Note, supra note 3, at 549-58; Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). If the Court's description of the attorney's
vital role is accurate, then the Court's restriction of the right to counsel to only imprisoned
indigent defendants assures a fair trial to some indigent litigants while denying the same
assurances to other indigents. It is anomalous to hold that an individual sentenced to five
days in jail has a right to counsel (and thus, presumably, a fair trial) but deny that right to an
individual charged with a substantial fine, or who suffers the loss of nonmonetary rights
such as status or reputation. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 604, & n.8 ("to offer counsel
when a single day in jail may be at stake, but to deny counsel to an indigent parent when the
destruction of his or her family is threatened does not accord with our concept of due process") (Vance, J.,
majority opinion); Rossman, The Scope of the Sixth Amendment." ho is
the Criminal Defendant, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 633, 647-49 (1975) (civil litigants suffer some
deprivation of liberty even if imprisonment is not imposed). Cf.Nowak, Foreword-DueProcess Methodology in the PostincorporationWorld, 74 J. CRIM. L.E. 397, 408-09 (1979); 93
HARV. L. REV. 82, 88 (1979) (penalties such as disqualification from certain jobs and the
denial of state licenses or privileges, can be as "onerous" to the defendant as actual
imprisonment).
58. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.Eldridge. Three Factors in Search Of A Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L.
REv. 28, n.l (1976).
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liberty and property."59 If such an interest is involved, then the due process clause is implicated, and the Court must determine whether the applicable procedures meet the constitutional requirements of due process. 60 In
Goldberg v. Kelly,6 ' the Court held that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was required to terminate income maintenance payments under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.6 2 The Court
found that the welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory entitlement...
more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "63 Accordingly, the due process
clause was implicated. Because the payments constituted the recipients'
sole subsistence, both the recipients and the state had an interest in assuring that the payments were not erroneously denied.' That interest, the
Court concluded, clearly outweighed the state's interest in preventing "any
increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens." 65 The Court, therefore,
held that only a pretermination hearing, affording the recipients the opportunity to contest the proposed termination, would provide the recipients
with due process of law.66
The balancing of the individual's interests, the government's interests
and the adequacy of existing procedures was also applied in Gagnon v.
Scarelli.67 In Scarpelli, the indigent probationer requested the appointment of counsel in his probation revocation hearing. The Court found the
probationer's liberty interest to be less than "the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled" due to his probation restrictions; the severity of
loss was therefore minimal.6" The Court also found that the government's
interest in quick and inexpensive hearings was significant, as was the
maintenance of the special nature of the revocation hearings. 69 Finally,
59. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); and supra note 1. Prior to Roth, the Court often used a balancing test to determine if
the due process clause was implicated. See, e.g., Richardson v. Pearles, 402 U.S. 389 (1971);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Roth proscribed the use of a balancing
test in the initial determination of whether the due process clause was implicated by requiring the protected interest to be within the fourteenth amendment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; see
also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60. See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
62. Id at 261-64. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976).
63. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
64. Id at 266. The AFDC benefits were based on the recipient's financial need. Id See
infra note 78.
65. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
66. Id
67. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
68. Id at 784. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (a parole revocation
hearing does not involve "absolute liberty," but only "conditional liberty").
69. Id
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the requested procedure-appointment of counsel-would be inappropriate because it was costly and burdensome. 7° Accordingly, the Court held
that an indigent probationer does not have an absolute right to appointment of counsel in probation revocation hearings.7"
In Mathews v. Eldridge,72 the Court refined and clarified the balancing
test. George Eldridge was awarded social security disability benefits in
1968. In 1972, his benefits were terminated when the state agency administering the benefit program determined that he was able to return to work.73
Eldridge appealed the termination of his benefits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, bypassing the complex adjudicatory system of the Social Security Administration. 74 He argued that
due process entitled a disability beneficiary to a pretermination evidentiary
hearing. 75 The district court issued an injunction reinstating Eldridge's
benefits pending an evidentiary hearing, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.7 6
The Supreme Court utilized the three-pronged balancing test on appeal.
The Court first characterized the termination of disability payments as a
deprivation of a protected property interest,77 but distinguished that property interest from the welfare recipients' interest in Goldberg v. Kelly.78
70. Id.
71. Id See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (appointment of counsel in an informal
school disciplinary proceeding would create an inappropriate adversary atmosphere). The
three elements most often incorporated into the Court's balancing test were the severity of
loss which the individual suffers, the government's interest, and the appropriateness of the
requested procedure. See Note, supra note 1, at 1514.
72. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
73. Id at 323-24.
74. 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973).
75. Id
76. 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974).
77. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.
78. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court stated that "termination of aid (welfare) . . . may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits." Id. at 264 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the disability benefits paid to Eldridge
were not contingent on financial need. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340. But see Mashaw, supra
note 58, at 39 & n.42:
[The Eldridge test] is subjective and impressionistic. . . . [The Court] assumes
that disability recipients are less dependent on income support than welfare recipients. This assumption is buttressed only by the notion that welfare is for the needy
and disability insurance is for prior taxpayers. . . . [However,] any number of
circumstances might make a terminated welfare recipient's plight less desperate
than that of his disabled SSA counterpart, or vice versa.
The terminated welfare recipient may have access to home or general relief depending upon his residence, whereas the disability claimant in a different state or
locality may not. The disability claimant may be totally dependent for his livelihood on the disability payments, whereas the welfare recipient who is terminated
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The degree of potential deprivation to Eldridge was not necessarily as severe as the loss of welfare payments in Goldberg.7 9 The Court next concluded that the "prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with
an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before denial of his claim becomes final." 8 Finally,
the state's interest in controlling costs and easing the administrative burden, although not controlling, was certainly relevant in assessing Eldridge's request for an evidentiary hearing. 8 ' Balancing the petitioner's
interests, the procedural safeguards, and the state's interests, the Court
held that "an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination
of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully
comport with due process. '"82
The factors weighed in the Eldridge test are equally relevant to other
due process inquiries.8 3 Most important for this discussion is the application of the Eldridge test to determine whether indigent civil litigants are
entitled to court appointed counsel. In Davis v. Page, 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this specific issue in the
context of a prolonged deprivation of custody case.

IV.

DAvis

v PAGE: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS ABSOLUTE

The leading and most representative case dealing with the right to counsel in a termination of parental rights or prolonged deprivation of custody
case is Davis v. Page.8 5 The Davis court exhaustively canvassed court decisions and state legislative findings, and concluded that the great majority
"have found a right to counsel in proceedings where prolonged or permamay have been receiving a small AFDC payment to supplement inadequate family
earnings.
79. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340.
80. Id at 349.
81. Id at 348-49.
82. Id at 349.
83. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
The Eldridge test was recently cited as controlling in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599600 (1979). The Court held that a preadmission adversary hearing is not mandated when
parents seek to commit their minor children to a state psychiatric hospital, as long as there
is some inquiry by an uninterested factfinder. Id at 601-04. In this instance, the Court also
relied on the medical nature of the proceedings. Id at 607. Essentially, the Court focuses
on the interests at stake and the nature of the proceedings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. at 788-91.
84. 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
85. Id
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nent separation of parent and child is threatened. 8 6 On January 30, 1976,
Hilary Davis took her fourteen month old son, Carl, to a local hospital
after her husband had broken the baby's arm.87 Social workers refused to
allow Mrs. Davis to leave the hospital with her son, and the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) filed dependency
proceedings in the circuit court.88 On February 4, the judge advised Mrs.
Davis to retain counsel for the adjudicatory proceeding to be held the following month. Mrs. Davis was not able to afford counsel, and was unrepresented at the adjudicatory proceeding.8 9
Carl Davis was declared a dependent child 9° and temporary custody
was given to the DHRS. 9' Mrs. Davis was not informed of her right to
appeal under Florida law. After the appeal period passed, Mrs. Davis obtained counsel and eventually filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the Flordia Supreme Court. Upon the supreme court's dismissal
86. Id at 604 nn.9 & 10 (citing Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1977);
Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); Crist v. Division of
Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974), modified, 135 N.J.
Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (1975); In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285 N.E.2d 288
(1972); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980); In re Mitchell,
251 Or. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968); In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973); In
re Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); State ex rel. Lemaster v.
Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.2d 140 (1974); Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1977). See also
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev.
1979). But see, In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968)).
Some of the relevant statutes cited by the Davis court are: ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 15-63(b)
(1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-225 (Cum. Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1106(l)(b)(ii) (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(b) (Supp. V 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 701-20(1) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4005.12 (Supp.
1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-821 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2)
(West 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-205.06 (1943); N.Y. JUD. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1974); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1109(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.498(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.2 (1976).
87. 640 F.2d at 600.
88. Id at 600-01.
89. Id at 601. Under Florida law, the adjudicatory hearing is a formal adversary proceeding similar to the North Carolina termination of parental rights proceeding. Compare
FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.22 to 7A-289.32. See Davis v.
Page, 640 F.2d at 601 ("such hearings are formal adversary proceedings").
90. Under Florida law, a dependent child can be placed in his own home or the home
of a relative, temporarily or permanently committed to a licensed child-care agency or to the
DHRS. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1).
91. "(T]he phrase 'temporary custody' belies the serious consequences of an adjudication of dependency. Temporary custody continues until terminated by the court or until the
child reaches the age of 18." Davis, 640 F.2d at 601. See FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1)(c). In
addition, in the proceedings to regain custody, the state does not have the burden of proof.
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.408(1)(b) and 39.408(2).
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without opinion, Mrs. Davis brought suit in federal court.92 The district
court granted summary judgment to Mrs. Davis, and a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.93
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, held that "where prolonged or
indefinite deprivation of parental custody is threatened, due process requires that an indigent parent be offered counsel and that counsel be provided unless a knowing and intelligent waiver is made." 94 The court
utilized the Eldridge test to reach its holding. The court found the interest
of a parent in raising a child to be "far more precious . . . than property
rights,"" stating that "[ilt is difficult to imagine a loss more grievous than
that of a parent deprived of his or her child."'9 6 The facts in Mrs. Davis's
case, the court asserted, clearly illustrated the significant and typical disadvantages encountered by an unrepresented indigent defendant.97 The
presence of counsel could have prevented an erroneous decision. 98 Finally, the court rejected an argument that appointment of counsel would
impose an undue financial burden on the state. Given its parenspatriae
function,99 the State was obligated to do all it could to assure a proper
decision, including the appointment of counsel." °° The court concluded
92. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
93. Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 604. It should be noted that the deprivation of custody in
Davis was less severe than the termination of parental rights in Lassiter even though Mrs.
Davis was denied custody for an extended period of time. See FLA. STAT. § 39-41(1).
95. Davis, 640 F.2d at 603 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
96. 640 F.2d at 603.
97. Id See, e.g., In re A.Z., 383 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1980).
98. Davis, 640 F.2d at 603. The court said:
Mrs. Davis was unfamiliar with the judicial process and easily intimidated by its
workings. She was ignorant of the substantive governing law, unaware even that
the dependency hearing might result in an indefinite separation from her child.
Unacquainted with the rules of evidence, she was unable to challenge hearsay and
opinion testimony. The trial judge found that '[s]he sat silently through most of the
hearing ... fearful of antagonizing the social workers' and that she 'was little
more than a spectator in the adjudicatory proceeding.'
Id
99. The doctrine ofparenspatriae is essentially the state's sovereign power of guardianship. Traditionally, equity courts "acknowledged and insisted that the state owed a duty of
protection to children or persons under a disability ...." FloridaJuvenile Law and Practice, § 1.11 (1979). See Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). The duty includes the care,
protection, and discipline of its citizens. See Note, supra note 6, at 216; Thomas, Child.4buse
and Neglect, Part P HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L.
REV. 293, 313-22 (1972).
100. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 604. The Court further stated that "[w]here the right to
counsel is essential to the protection of a liberty so basic to the fabric and philosophy of our
society, the interest in saving an uncertain sum will not defeat that right." Id See also
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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that "[tlhe right involved is absolute and should not be subject to the discretion of the trial judge."' '°
Davis was the last termination or prolonged deprivation of custody case
decided prior to Lassiter. The Davis court held that an indigent parent
had an absolute right to appointment of counsel in prolonged deprivation
of custody cases. The Lassiter Court reached a contrary conclusion, departing from the prevailing law, in a strikingly similar factual setting.
V.

LASSITER

v

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SER VICES: ADDING A

FOURTH ELEMENT TO THE BALANCING TEST

In 1975, Abby Gail Lassiter lost custody of her son, William, for failing
to care adequately for her child. William was eight months old and was
suffering from "breathing difficulties, malnutrition . . . [and scarring
from] a severe infection that had gone untreated."' 2 Ms. Lassiter was
later convicted of second-degree murder in an unrelated incident and began serving a prison sentence of twenty-five to forty years. 10 3 In 1978, the
county Department of Social Services petitioned the court to terminate Ms.
Lassiter's parental rights."° Ms. Lassiter never mentioned the Department's petition to the attorney retained for her appeal in the murder
case.'° 5 At the hearing, the judge determined that Ms. Lassiter's failure to
obtain counsel was "without cause," and therefore did not appoint counsel."° The Department was represented by its own attorney.
A Department of Social Services employee testified that Ms. Lassiter
had exhibited a total disregard for William, and that Ms. Lassiter's mother
07
would not be able to care for William if he were placed in her home.'
Ms. Lassiter then conducted a completely ineffective cross-examination. 0 s
The judge's attempts to explain the cross-examination roles and to confine
Ms. Lassiter's cross-examination to questions directed toward the witness
101. Davis, 640 F.2d at 604.

102. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20 (1981).
103. Id at 20. See State v. Lassiter, 33 N.C. App. 405, 235 S.E.2d 289 (1977). Ms.
Lassiter's prison sentence was not a ground for terminating her parental rights. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1981).
104. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20.

105. Id at 21.
106. Id at 22.

107. Id
108. The following excerpts from the transcript illustrate Ms. Lassiter's difficulty:
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were equally ineffective.' °9 Consequently, Ms. Lassiter's argumentative
statements were disallowed and she failed to contest any of the social
worker's statements. The judge also became frustrated and "noticeably
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. LASSITER:
Q. The only thing I know is that when you sayTHE COURT: I don't want you to testify.
MS. L.: Okay.
THE COURT: I want to know whether you want to cross-examine her or ask
any questions.
MS. L.: Yes, I want to. Well, you know, the only thing I know about is my part
that I know about it. I knowTHE COURT: I am not talking about what you know. I want to know if you
want to ask her any questions or not.
MS. L.: About that?
THE COURT: Yes. Do you understand the nature of this proceeding?
MS. L.: Yes.
THE COURT: And that is to terminate any rights you have to the child and
place it for adoption, if necessary.
MS. L.: Yes, I know.
THE COURT: Are there any questions you want to ask her about what she
has testified to?
MS. L.: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
Q. I want to know why you think that you are going to turn my child over to a
foster home? He knows my mother and he knows all of us. He knows her and he
knows all of us.
THE COURT: Who is he?
Q My son, William.
A. Ms. Lassiter, your son has been in foster care since May of 1975 and since
that timeQ Yeah, yeah and I didn't know anything about it either.
THE COURT: Just let her answer the question.
Q. And I want to say what they told me at the hospitalTHE COURT: Will you please keep quiet for one minute. We don't want you
to testify except under oath. Is there anything else you want to ask her about the
child? Now, I don't want you to tell us anything, I just want you to ask questions.
Anything else you want to ask her? See, at this time you are not entitled to testify,
you have to be sworn. So you can ask her questions but you can't tell us about it
until after you're sworn.
Q. All right. Oh, yes, when you were saying about-that we didn't get in contact with-about you said we didn't get in contact with you about my son, well I
didn't know who the social service was that's why I didn't contact him because they
had changed social services and I didn't know who the social service was.
THE COURT: You're telling us about it again. Just ask her any questions you
want to. I want to give you a fair try. Anything else you want to ask her?
MS. L.: No, I don't have anything else.
THE COURT: All right, ma'am, you can stand down.
Hearing Transcript at 19-20, 24, Lassiter.
109. See id
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impatient" with Ms. Lassiter; 0 during her direct testimony, he openly
mocked one of her answers."'
On direct examination, conducted by the trial judge, Ms. Lassiter denied
that she had neglected William and claimed that she had seen him five or
six times after the 1975 custody hearing." 12 She also stated that, because
William could not be with her, her mother should receive custody.1 3 Her
mother testified that she could care for William and she vehemently denied the social worker's statement that she had not visited William while
he was in state custody." 4 The court found that Ms. Lassiter had "willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for the welfare of the
minor," 115 and therefore terminated her parental rights. After two unsuccessful appeals," 6 Ms. Lassiter17 filed a petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court."
Before analyzing Ms. Lassiter's claim that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment mandated the appointment of counsel in her termination proceeding, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, acknowledged
that although "due process" has never been precisely defined,"' the
"phrase [does] express the requirement of 'fundamental fairness.' "" He
noted that the criminal cases dealing with the appointment of counsel held
that imprisonment, of any length, was a prerequisite to the operation of the
right to counsel.' 20 Citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli 21, Justice Stewart also
found that "as a litigant's interest inpersonal liberty diminishes, so does

110.

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 54-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 108.
111. See Hearing Transcript at 30:
THE COURT: Did you know your mother filed a complaint on the 8th day of
May, 1975 . . . ?
A. No, cause she said she didn't fie no complaint.
THE COURT: That was some ghost who came up here and filed it I suppose.
112. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23.
113. Id Her mother had custody of Ms. Lassiter's other children. Id During her testimony, Ms. Lassiter argued that her mother should have custody of William because: "He
knows us. Children know they family. . . . They know they people, they know they family
and that child knows us anywhere. . . . I got four more other children. Three girls and a
boy and they know they little brother when they see him." Id
114. Id.
115. Id at 24.
116. See supra note 18.
117. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
118. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24.
119. Id
120. Id at 26-27. Justice Stewart cited Argersinger and Scott to support his analysis. See
supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
121. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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his right to State appointed counsel."' 122 The litigant in Gagnon had a
lesser interest in personal liberty because he was free on probation, a status
the court called "conditional liberty." 23 'The Court refused to create a per
se rule mandating appointment of counsel at probation or parole revocation hearings. Justice Stewart concluded that
the Court's precedents speak with one voice about what "fundamental fairness" has meant when the Court has considered the
right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical
liberty. 124
Without explanation, Justice Stewart added that "[iut is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due process decision must be
25
measured." 1
Turning to the civil analysis of due process, Justice Stewart relied primarily on the three-pronged Eldridge test. 126 Accordingly, he analyzed
Ms. Lassiter's interests at stake in the litigation, the State's interest, and the
risk that the procedures used would lead to an erroneous decision. Justice
Stewart found that Ms. Lassiter's interest in the hearing, the possible termination of her parental rights, was a "commanding" one. 127 Similarly,
he found that the State had a strong interest in protecting its citizens and in
promoting fair and equitable decisions. 128 The State also had economic
interests, such as the cost of counsel and the concomitant lengthening of
the proceeding.' 29 Finally, after analyzing the applicable statutes, Justice
Stewart found that the complexity of termination proceedings could, but
122. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26 (emphasis supplied). See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
123. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480.
124. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
125. Id at 27. Presumably, Justice Stewart was referring to the elements in the Eldridge
test, since he immediately discussed Eldridge after this statement. Id The conflation of the
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when he faces
loss of his physical liberty and the Eldridge test, however, had never before been applied in a
due process analysis of the right to counsel in civil litigation.
126. See supra notes 72-83, 125 and accompanying text.
127. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. In a termination of parental rights, "the State's aim is not
simply to influence the parent-child relationship but to extinguish it. A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable." Id at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted). North Carolina's absolute termination orders are similar to
most states' termination orders. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981) with
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232.6 (West) (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-17 (1978); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 211.482 (Supp. 1981).

128. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28.
129. Id at 28.
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130
would not always, generate erroneous decisions.
Justice Stewart then stated that the Court must balance the three elements of the Eldridge test "against each other, and then set their net weight
in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed
counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom."' 3 ' The addition of this presumption to the balancing test
in the present case resulted in the Court's holding that a right to counsel
does not exist in every termination proceeding, and that the appointment
32
of counsel should be decided by the trial courts on a case-by-case basis.'
The Court found that the problems Ms. Lassiter encountered did not affect
of an attorthe final decision to terminate her rights, and that the presence
33
ney would not have made any appreciable difference.'
In a long, emotional and acerbic dissent, Justice Blackmun decried the
majority's conclusion that due process does not require counsel to be ap1 He further stated that it
pointed in every termination case as "illogical."' 34
was "virtually incredible" for the Court to hold that Ms. Lassiter's hearing
was fundamentally fair. 135 Justice Blackmun utilized the same due process
elements of the Eldridge test that the majority found controlling, 36 but
found the majority's "insensitive presumption that incarceration is the
only loss of liberty sufficiently onerous to justify a right to appointed counsel" to be totally inconsistent with the adaptable and flexible nature of due

process. '37

Justice Blackmun considered Ms. Lassiter's stake in the litigation to be
paramount. 138 He stated that the North Carolina procedures were "dis130. Id. at 31.
131. Id at 27.
132. Id. at 31-32. Justice Stewart was relying on the precedent of Scarpelli. See supra
notes 67-7 1.
133. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33. The Court found that Ms. Lassiter's case "presented no
specially troublesome points of law," that some of Ms. Lassiter's arguments were understood
by the trial judge, that Ms. Lassiter had not made an effort either to speak to her retained
lawyer (her lawyer from her previous murder trial) or to appear at an earlier custody hearing, and that "the weight of the evidence that she had few sparks of... interest [in her son)
was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a
determinative difference." Id
dissenting).
134. Id. at 49 (Blackmun, J.,
135. Id at 57.
136. Justice Blackmun adopted the majority's use of the Eldridge test, and defined Ms.
Lassiter's liberty interest by citing the same case as the majority: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972). Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, noted that Justice Blackmun met the
majority "on its own terms." 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id at 42.
138. Id. at 38-40.
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tinctly formal and adversarial" with an "accusatory and punitive focus."' 39
These proceedings could thus be distinguished from the short, informal or
primarily medical proceedings that the Court had previously determined
did not require appointment of counsel.' 4 ° Under Ms. Lassiter's circumstances, he reasoned, the presence of an attorney would certainly diminish
the possibility of erroneous termination."'4 Finally, although the State has
an important interest in protecting its citizens, the cost of providing counsel is relatively minimal compared to the parent's interests. Casting the
pertinent interests in this light, Justice Blackmun concluded that Ms.
42
Lassiter was entitled to an attorney.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that termination of parental
rights involves a serious "deprivation of both liberty and property, because
statutory rights of inheritance as well as the natural relationships may be
destroyed."' 14 3 He agreed with Justice Blackmun that the Eldridge test required appointment of counsel in Ms. Lassiter's case, but also argued that
the issue was simply one of fundamental fairness that did not necessitate
an analysis of pecuniary cost.'"
139. Id at 42-46. The statutes provide for the filing of a formal petition delineating the
grounds for terminating parental rights, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289-25; a summons requesting an answer is also issued, id § 7A-289.27. The hearing is "conducted by the district court
sitting without a jury." Id § 7A-289.30. Formal rules of evidence still apply, except the
husband-wife or physician-patient relationship privilege, and all findings of fact must be
"based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." Id
140. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-09 (1979) (voluntary civil commitment of a
minor by his parents); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (informal school disciplinary
proceeding); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearing). See
supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
141. Justice Blackmun argued that the available statistics, rejected by the majority as
"unilluminating," illustrated the need for counsel. See 452 U.S. at 29 n.5; id at 46 nn. 14-15.
"When the parent is indigent, lacking in education, and easily intimidated by figures of
authority, the imbalance may well become insuperable." Id (footnote omitted).
A Parent Representation Study showed that parents represented by counsel had a "higher
rate of dismissed petitions, 25% to 7.9%, and lower rates of neglect adjudications, 62.5% to
79.5%... " Id at 46 n. 15 (citing Representation in Child Neglect Cases.- Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 230, 241 (1968)) [hereinafter cited as Parent Representation Study]. A North Carolina study produced similar findings: represented parents
prevailed 5.5% of the time, unrepresented parents prevailed only .15% of the time. Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 46 n.15.
142. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 52-56. Justice Blackmun also argued that persons similarly
situated are entitled to appointment of counsel. Id at 57-58.
143. Id at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id at 59-60. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 599, 604. Essentially, Justice Stevens'
fundamental fairness argument reflects due process analysis prior to Gideon. See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); and Note,
supra note I.
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THE EFFECT OF LASSITER: EVISCERATION OF AN INDIGENT'S
RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN TERMINATION
HEARINGS

The new interest-balancing test adopted by the Lassiter majority is most
effectively analyzed through a discussion of its impact on indigent parents
in termination of parental rights hearings. This will provide an insight
into the practical shortcomings of the test, while highlighting the possible
adverse consequences inflicted upon indigent parents in termination hearings. A narrow, practical discussion is necessitated because Lassiter involved only the rights of indigent litigants in parental rights termination
proceedings.
The utilitarian balancing of interests adopted in Eldridge has several
drawbacks when applied, as it was in Lassiter, in an inflexible manner.' 4 5
In addition, the Eldridge test itself is "a crude sort of social welfare function"' 4 6 that tends to negate the property or liberty interests at stake.' 4 7
The Lassiter decision is a vivid example of the negation of property and
liberty interests inherent in the Eldridge test.'4 8 A parent's interest in his
or her children has been described as "essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness,"' and "far more precious . . . than property rights."'
The
145. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 539-43.
The Court's unwillingness to consider values beyond accuracy of result in the context of a utilitarian balancing test when deciding what process is due, and the
Court's grant of a strong presumption of constitutionality to statutory procedural
provisions, amount to a serious abdication of traditional notions ofjudicial responsibility under the due process clauses.
Id at 542-43. See Mashaw, supra note 58, at 47-50. The Eldridge test "utilitarian calculus
tends, as cost-benefit analysis typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and ambiguities." Id at 48.
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 1,at 540.
147. See id at 540-4 1; Mashaw, supra note 58, at n. 1.Note, supra note 1. By assigning a
weight to the government's interests, the test eliminates an absolute protection of a liberty or
property interest. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1,at 540. The test's emphasis on economic costs
and the presumption that the government's procedures are constitutional also tends to negate liberty and property interests. Id.
148. For the proposition that a liberty interest is involved in a termination of parental
rights, see, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 519, 535 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 602; Danforth v. State Dep't of Health &
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973). In Lassiter, Justice Stevens also found a property interest. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d at 604 ("The
interest in family integrity is one comparable to being free of restraint."). Parental rights are
"more precious to many people than the right to life itself." In re Gibson, 483 P.2d 131, 135
(Wash. App. 1971). See also Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children.: A
Searchfor Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 989-93 (1975).
150. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. at 533.
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Court has also deemed family relationships a fundamental right."'5 In the
Lassiter decision, these substantial interests and rights paled in light of the
allegedly fair state procedures and the overriding state economic interests.' 52 Ms. Lassiter was therefore denied appointment of counsel despite
do not
the large number of cases holding that a State's economic interests
53
outweigh the protection of an individual's liberty interests.
The inherent deficiencies in applying the Eldridge test restrictively are
also highlighted by the innumerable problems the Lassiter decision will
undoubtedly create. First, as Justice Blackmun illustrated, the case-bycase approach adopted by the majority does not lend itself practically to
judicial review.154 The transcript of a termination proceeding alone will
not be dispositive of whether an unrepresented indigent was disadvantaged.' 55 The transcript will not show whether the indigent litigant had
adequate discovery or access to legal resources necessary for constructing a
defense.' 56 Consequently, the reviewing court must expand its analysis
into a "cumbersome and costly," time-consuming investigation of the entire proceeding.' 5 7 Since the case-by-case approach involves a constitutional inquiry, "it necessarily will result in increased federal interference in
state proceedings."'' 5 ' This is contrary to the rationale in Gideon, wherein
the court developed an absolute standard in an attempt to obtain consistency and eliminate the time-consuming analysis of "special" circumstances."' Part of the rationale behind Gideon's prophylactic rule "was
that the previously prevailing 'special circumstances rule,' [the Betts v.
Brady decison] though requiring counsel on fewer occasions, had repeatedly resulted in messy and friction-generating factual inquiries into every
case."' 60 The Lassiter decision departs from the Gideon rationale, and will
accordingly produce numerous federal-state conflicts.
151. See Note, supra note 6. See, e.g., Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (city ordinance affecting family living arrangements invalidated because of its invasion of the deeply rooted institution of the family); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
152. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text. Ms. Lassiter's liberty interests were
effectively negated.
153. See cases cited supra in note 86. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
154. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. See id The transcript alone will not provide the appeals court with sufficient information to apply the Eldridge test. In addition, many factors not on the record will affect the
balance. See id
156. See id
157. Id
158. Id
159. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124-25 (1980).
160. Id
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A case-by-case approach is also time consuming and burdensome on the1
6
trial court. Not only must it determine in advance the need for counsel,'
it must develop pretrial procedures and standards in order to determine
properly the need for counsel. 162 There is no guarantee that these standards will produce equitable decisions in every case. Additionally, it will
not always be possible for the trial court to predict accurately, in advance
of the proceedings, what facts will be disputed, the character of cross-examination, or the testimony of various witnesses. 6 3 These factors increase
the possibility that appointment of counsel will be denied erroneously by
the trial court. Because of the procedural delays encountered in litigation
of appeals, the parent's rights could be terminated erroneously for an extended period of time. The parent also would be denied the custody of his
or her children during this period. An absolute right to counsel would
avoid any erroneous denial of appointment of counsel and would eliminate the need for cumbersome and time-consuming standards, while preserving the right to family integrity.
The Lassiter decision virtually ignored the special nature of the family
courts and the available statistical evidence concerning the impact of counsel in custody and termination hearings." 6 The Court also neglected to
consider the highly emotional and traumatic nature of most family court
disputes.' 6 5 This atmosphere, combined in many instances with the pressure of state-initiated termination, could severely affect an individual's
161. See Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975).
162. Davis, 640 F.2d at 604.
163. Id
164. Justice Stewart gave only a cursory examination of several relevant statistics. 452
U.S. at 29-30 & n.5; see supra note 141. He considered the statistics "unilluminating." Id
Under the restrictive Mathews test, Justice Stewart was not required to weigh the statistics.
See supra note 141. This is an illuminating example of how strict interest-balancing tends to
"dwarf" non-delineated elements or variables. See supra note 145. For additional statistics,
see Parent RepresentationStudy, supra note 141, at 242-43:
DISPOSITION

% Represented

% Unrepresented

By Counsel

By Counsel

18.2

40.6

45.4

39.6

9.1
9.1

5.0
3.0

Children placed outside the
home.

Discharged under court
supervision
Discharged without court
supervision
Petition dismissed after findings

18.2
11.8
Other
165. See Wald, supra note 149. For an excellent insight into the practical workings of

one family court system, see P. PRESCOTr, THE CHILD SAVERS (1981), discussing the New
York Family Court system.
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ability to present a defense.' 66 Adequate consideration of these factors
could have led the Court to decide the case in a manner more consistent
with Davis v. Page.
It is doubtful, however, that consideration of these factors would have
produced a different result in Lassiter, given the Court's unexplained and
unjustified addition of the fourth element to the balancing test-the presumption that no right to counsel exists unless imprisonment is imposed.
Davis and Lassiter reached diametrically opposed conclusions, yet both
courts relied on the three-pronged Eldridge test in deciding whether appointment of counsel was mandated. 67 In Lassiter, the inclusion of the
presumption that imprisonment is required tipped the scales in the state's
favor. Since actual imprisonment is rarely imposed in civil litigation, 168 it
is highly unlikely that any indigent civil litigant can overcome this presumption. As Justice Blackmun stated:
By emphasizing the value of physical liberty to the exclusion of
all other fundamental interests, the Court today grafts an unnecessary and burdensome new layer of analysis onto its traditional
three-factor balancing test. Apart from improperly conflating
two distinct lines of prior cases. . . the Court's reliance on a "rebuttable presumption" sets a dangerous precedent that may undermine objective judicial review regarding other procedural
protections. 6' 9
166. The necessity of state-appointed counsel is particularly acute in cases ...
where the State initiates a civil proceeding against an individual to deprive her of
the custody of her children. Here the State is employing the judicial mechanism it
has created to enforce society's will upon an individual and take away her children.
The case by its very nature resembles a criminal prosecution. The defendant is
charged with conduct-failure to care properly for her children-which may be
criminal and which in any event is viewed as reprehensible and morally wrong by
a majority of society. And the cost of being unsuccessful is dearly high-loss of the
companionship of one's children. . . . Certainly, if the State must provide funds
for an indigent mother's court costs for a divorce, the State should also provide her
with counsel to protect her rights to something far more important to most mothers
and to society-her right to custody of her children.
Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 954, 959-60 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting to the denial of
certiorari).
167. See supra notes 84-133 and accompanying text.
168. See Rossman, supra note 57, at 646-55. There is, of course, civil commitment for
alcoholism, mental retardation, and other similar afflictions. Id. A civil litigant can also be
held in contempt of court, and subsequently imprisoned, but in most civil litigation imprisonment is not a likely result. Id
169. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 41 n.8 (emphasis supplied). The Lassiter decision also presents
possible equal protection problems. See Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 944 (1974); Parent
Representation Study, supra note 141, at 251; Note, supra note 3, at 550 ("Separate right to
counsel for rich and poor may deny equal protections as well as due process."). See Note,
Child Neglect: Due Process for the Parent, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 465 (1970). See also

19821

Indigent Civil Litigants

VII.

CONCLUSION

The results of Lassiter are two-fold. First, the Court has combined two
different areas of due process law in order to ascertain what process is
mandated in a termination of rights hearing. Under this new analysis, the
three elements delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge must be balanced and the
result weighed against a fourth element-the presumption that an indigent
is entitled to appointment of counsel only where imprisonment is imposed.
Second, the Court has eviscerated the indigent's right to appointment of
counsel. By weighing the three elements in the Eldridge test and then setting their cumulative net weight against the presumption that the right to
counsel exists only where imprisonment is imposed, the Court has established a virtually unattainable prerequisite for appointment of counsel.
Since parents involved in termination proceedings rarely face imprisonment, under the Court's new four-part test they will rarely be entitled to
court appointed counsel.
Although Lassiter's holding applied to termination hearings, the fourpart test is broad enough to apply in all civil cases. A court applying the
new test would be obliged to consider imprisonment an effective precondition to appointment of counsel, and would thus deny appointment in most
civil cases. Such application beyond Lassiter's factual setting would be
unwarranted. It also would signal a move toward the absolute elimination
of an indigent's right to appointment of counsel in civil litigation. Such a
result is certainly not desirable nor "fundamentally fair."
Kevin W Shaughnessy

Rossman, supra note 57, at 648. Arguably, a nonindigent parent represented by his or her
own counsel will almost certainly turn the termination proceeding into a more formal adversary proceeding. Cleaver, 499 F.2d at 944. In this type of proceeding the parent's case will
be presented much more successfully. See supra note 141. Unrepresented indigent parents
would not enjoy this advantage. In a survey of judges in the Kings County, New York
Family Court, 72% of the judges reported that it was more difficult to conduct a fair hearing
when the parents were unrepresented; 66.7% found it more difficult to develop the facts in
hearings with unrepresented parents. See Parent Representation Study, supra note 141, at
253. By not establishing an absolute right to counsel, the Court has created an inequitable
situation where similarly situated parents would experience different results solely due to the
presence of counsel. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Note, Child Neglect.: Due Processfor the Parent,supra, at 476;
Rossman, supra note 57, at 648.
Significantly, the state of North Carolina recently amended its termination statutes, mandating the appointment of counsel in termination hearings where the indigent parent requests counsel. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(al) (1981).

